Nixon and Brezhnev had simultaneously developed an appreciation of the numerous advantages that were likely to benefit both sides from a relaxation of Soviet-American tensions in the world. There was a rough parity in strategic weaponry between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the fact of the certainy of mutual destruction, both superpowers shared a common interest in restraining an arms race that, it was now unmistakably understood, neither side could win. The economic advantages to be gained from a deceleration in military spending could be enjoyed. The large defense budgets of both superpowers had diverted financial resources that might otherwise have been available for the funding of domestic social programs and productive enterprises that would increase the standard of living of the Russian and American people.

Accordingly, on the day of Nixon’s inauguration (January 20, 1969) the Kremlin publicly proposed Soviet-American negotiations for the mutual limitation and reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and defensive systems. A week later the new American chief executive endorsed the Soviet proposal in a speech that also contained a significant modification of the traditional American position concerning the strategic balance that was bound to smooth the path toward accommodation with the U.S.S.R.: For the first time, an American president accepted the principle of strategic parity in place of the customary insistence on American strategic superiority. On November 17, 1969, the first formal talks began in Helsinki, Finland, between Soviet and American officials. Six subsequent sessions were held alternately in Vienna and Helsinki under the formal title, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

In September 1970 Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, reached an understanding concerning Cuban issues that had become more bitter and angry since the missile crisis of 1962. The Soviets agreed to stop building a submarine base in Cuba and to keep themselves from arming Castro with offensive missiles; the Americans promised in return that they would not invade. Characteristically Nixonian, the agreement was reached in secret; even after it was made virtually no one in government even knew of it. It therefore had no legal standing. Still, it indicated the search by both men for common ground on an inflammatory issue. In September 1971 the two leaders also accepted a four-power agreement that lessened tensions over Berlin, another of the world’s flashpoints. Although these moves toward détente did not the Cold War, they moderated hostility to some degree.

After two years of negotiations over the omplexties of strategic weaponry, an interim arms control agreement was signed on May 26, 1972, during Nixon’s unprecedented official visit to Moscow.

Instead of attempting to impose limits on the number of nuclear bombs that had been stockpiled by the two superpowers in the course of the previous two decades, the SALT negotiators concentrated on two other components of the strategic balance that proved more susceptible to agreement. The first was the delivery vehicles that would carry the warheads to their targets. A ceiling was placed on the number of ICBMs* that each side could deploy for a period of five years (October 3, 1972, to October 3, 1977). The effect of this limitation was to freeze the existing number of American ICBMs at 1054 while permitting the Soviet Union to expand its ICBM arsenal from 1530 to 1618. A temporary stop of equivalent duration was declared on the construction of submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs**), leaving the Soviet Union with 950 missiles in 62 submarines compared to 710 American missiles in 44 submarines. These two agreements represented the first successful effort by the two superpowers to establish quantitative limits on their strategic delivery systems.

The second issue to be addressed at the SALT I talks was the so-called Antiballistic Missile System (ABM***) that was designed to intercept and destroy incoming missiles before they reached their targets.

The SALT I agreement limited each side to the deployment of 100 ABM launchers and interceptor missiles at two sites, one to be the national capital and the other to be an ICBM missile base. The logic underlying this feature of the SALT I agreement was that it preserved the stability of the strategic balance by reducing the incentive of either side to gamble on a first attack: If one side could protect its command centre and one of its land-based ICBM sites, it would thereby retain the capacity to retaliate in spite of the total destruction of its remaining nuclear arsenal by a surprise attack.

The Soviet Union retained superiority in the total number of missiles covered by the SALT I agreement (ICBMs and SLBMs). Neverthless, Nixon was able to assure that the United States enjoyed the overall parity with its principal enemy because of American superiority in strategic weapons systems not covered by the treaty limitations. First of all, the United States retained a considerable advantage in the number of long-range bombers. Second, the Soviet Union had no counterpart in the western hemisphere to the American intermediate-range missiles stationed in Europe that could reach cities in western Russia. Third, the British and French nuclear forces, however much weaker in comparison to those of the two superpowers, provided an additional advantage to the United States unavailable to the Soviet Union, which refused to permit its East Europeon satellites to develop independent nuclear forces and could hardly count the Chinese nuclear armament on the plus of its strategic ledger.

But the decisive equalizer for the United States was its technological superiority in the development of warheads. Many of the American land-based and submarine-based missiles had fitted with multiple warheads, each of which could be targeted for a different site. These so-called Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs****) greatly increased the destructive power and reduced the vulnerability to interception of each American missile that was included in the SALT I numerical limitations. Moreover, while it was relatively easy to detect through satellite military exploration the number of land-based and submarine-based missiles a nation possessed, it was virtually impossible to check the number of independently targetable warheads each missile contained.

In sum, the two superpowers remained roughly equal in their strategic capability as a consequence of the SALT I treaty concluded in May 1972. Each side’s ability to destroy the other many times over remained no damage. The exclusion of long-range bombers, MIRVs, intermediate-and medium-range missiles, and other important components of the strategic balance left the two superpowers free to expand their nuclear capability by those and other means. Yet it must be reemphasized that the treaty represented the first successful effort to impose some restrains on the nuclear arms race since that race had begun at the end of the 1940s. Moreover, it was specificially recognized as an interim agreement of five-year duration, to be succeeded by a more comprehensive treaty. The forced resignation of Nixon in August 1974 did not hinder the ongoing Soviet-American negotiations for an arms control treaty to replace the SALT I agreement that was to expire in 1977. Continuity of policy had been assured through the retention of Kissinger as secretary of state by Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford. Ford and Brezhnev were able to conclude an interim agreement at the Vladivostok summit conference on November 24, 1974, which established guidelines for a SALT II treaty that would limit categories of strategic delivery vehicles not covered by SALT I (such as MIRVs and long-range bombers). For the first time since the start of the Cold War, officials in Washington and Moscow were confidently forecasting an end to the unrestrained competition for strategic superiority between the superpowers.

*International Ballistic Missile (ICBM): During the Cold War, a missile launched from the United States that was capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union, and vice versa.

**Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM): A ballistic missile launched from submarines, which is less accurate than the land-based missile but much less vulnerable to a first strike.

***Anti Ballistic Missile System (ABM): A missile system designed to intercept and destroy an incoming ballistic missile before it reaches it targets.

****Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehiles (MIRV): Several warheads attached to a single missile; they can be aimed at seperate targets.

In other areas the United States and the Soviet Union made more substantial progress. American businesspeople moved forward gradually inroads into the Soviet market place, and some farmers also received significant rewards when disastrous harvests at home led the Soviet Union to purchase several billion dollars worth of America wheat, corn, and soybeans.